Proposal for a Council Regulation (EC) imposing a definitive anti-dumping duty on imports of stainless steel bars originating in India and collecting definitively the provisional duty imposed (presented by the Commission). COM (98) 581 final, 16 October 1998 by unknown






Proposal for a 
COUNCIL REGULATION (EC) 
imposing a definitive anti-dumping duty on imports of stainless steel bars originating 
in India and collecting definitively the provisional duty imposed 
(presented by the Commission) 

EXPLANATORY MEMORANDUM 
1) The Commission, by Regulation (EC) No 1084, on 30 May 1998 imposed 
provisional anti-dumping duties on imports of stainless steel bars originating in 
India. On 18 July 1998 the Commission, by Regulation (EC) No 1556/98, 
imposed provisional countervailing duties on imports of stainless steel bars 
originating in India, amending the provisional anti-dumping duties. 
2) For ils definitive findings the Commission has taken into account the arguments 
raised by interested parties following provisional disclosure, as well as any 
changes subsequently made to the provisional findings. However, the essential 
findings of the Commission, i.e. that the Community industry has suffered 
material injury caused by the dumped imports from India, are confirmed. 
3) Modifications of the dumping margins were made, where necessary, in respect of 
claims made by the co-operating exporters concerned. 
4) After the imposition of provisional measures it was noted that one Indian 
company, which had for the purpose of provisional findings been considered as a 
party without export sales during the investigation period, had actually exported 
the product concerned to the Community during the investigation period. 
Consequently, an individual dumping margin was established for this exporter at 
the stage of definitive findings. 
5) Revised price undercutting and injury elimination margins were also established 
to exclude transactions of Indian product types for which no matching Community 
product type ensuring, however, that the remaining transactions were sufficiently 
representative. 
6) In accordance with Article 9 of Council Regulation (EC) No 384/96 the 
Commission therefore proposes that the Council impose definitive anti-dumping 
duties on imports of stainless steel bars originating in India. 
7) When the Anti-Dumping Committee was consulted on the imposition of definitive 
measures a majority of the Member States was in favour of the proposal. 
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COUNCIL REGULATION (EC) No 
of 
imposing a definitive anti-dumping duty on imports of stainless steel bars originating 
in India and collecting definitively the provisional duty imposed 
THE COUNCIL OF THE EUROPEAN UNION 
Having regard to the Treaty establishing the European Community, 
Having regard to Council Regulation (EC) No 384/96 of 22 December 1995 on 
protection against dumped imports from countries not members of the European 
Community (*) as last amended by Regulation (EC) No 905/98 (2), and in particular 
Article 9 thereof, 
Having regard to the proposal submitted by the Commission alter consulting the 
Advisory Committee, 
Whereas: 
A. PROVISIONAL MEASURES 
(1) By Commission Regulation (EC) No 1084/98 (3) (hereafter referred to as 'the 
provisional duty Regulation') a provisional anti-dumping duty was imposed on 
imports into the Community of stainless steel bars (hereinafter referred to as 
'SSB* or 'the product concerned*) falling within CN codes 7222 20 11, 7222 20 
21,7222 20 31, and 7222 20 81 originating in India. 
(*) OJ L 36,6.3.19%, p. 1. 
(2) OJ L 128,30. 4. 1998, p. 18. 
( 3 )OJL 155,29.5. 1998, p. 3. 
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(2) The provisional duty Regulation was amended by Commission Regulation (EC) 
No 1556/98 (4) imposing a provisional countervailing duty on imports of the 
same product originating in India. Pursuant to Article 14(1) of Regulation (EC) 
No 384/96 (hereinafter referred to as the 'Basic Regulation') and Article 24(1) 
of Regulation (EC) No 2026/97 on protection against subsidized imports from 
countries not members of the European Community (5), this amendment was 
necessary in order to avoid the product being subject to both anti-dumping and 
countervailing duties for the purpose of dealing with one and the same situation 
arising from dumping or from export subsidization. 
B. SUBSEQUENT PROCEDURE 
(3) Following the adoption of the Regulation imposing provisional duties, several 
interested parties submitted comments in writing. The parties who so requested 
were granted an opportunity to be heard by the Commission. 
(4) The Commission continued to seek and verify all information it deemed 
necessary for its definitive findings. 
(4) OJ L 202,18. 7.1998, p. 40. 
(5) OJL288.21. 10.1997, p. 1. 
(5) Parties were informed of the essential facts and considerations on the basis of 
which it was intended to recommend the imposition of a definitive anti-dumping 
duty and the definitive collection of amounts secured by way of provisional 
duty. They were also granted a period in which to make representations 
subsequent to this disclosure. 
(6) The oral and written comments submitted by the interested parties were 
considered and, where appropriate, the definitive findings were changed 
accordingly. 
C. PRODUCT UNDER CONSIDERATION AND LIKE PRODUCT 
(7) The product concerned by the investigation is stainless steel bars and rods, not 
further worked than cold-formed or cold-finished, containing by weight 2.5% or 
more of nickel, of circular cross-section as well as of other cross sections. 
(8) Following the adoption of the Regulation imposing provisional duties, some 
Indian exporting producers argued that the products exported to the Community 
and those sold on the domestic market in India were not comparable, for 
instance in terms of chemical characteristics, and consequently could not be 
considered to be a like product. 
5" 
(9) This claim could not be accepted since it was found that SSB produced and sold 
domestically in India as well as Indian SSB sold on the Community market had 
the same basic physical, technical and chemical characteristics and uses. The 
question of whether there were, on a per type basis, any differences between 
SSB sold domestically and on the export market was dealt with in the context of 
the determination of normal value and the comparison of normal value with 
export prices. 
(10) One exporting producer claimed that products corresponding to the standard 
DIN 1013 fell within the scope of the current anti-dumping proceeding and 
should therefore be taken into consideration. It was found, however, that these 
products were hot rolled bars and therefore not covered by the scope of the 
investigation as set out in the notice of initiation (6) and the provisional duty 
Regulation. In addition, it was noted that they did not fall within the relevant 
CN codes subject to measures. Consequently, this claim was not accepted. 
(11) As no other arguments were presented, the findings set out in recitals (9) to (12) 
of the provisional duty Regulation are confirmed. 




(12) The determination of dumping in the provisional duty Regulation did not take 
into account any differences in diameter when classifying the various product 
types since it was-concluded that this did not have an impact on the production 
costs per kilogram or on the selling price per kilogram. However, two exporting 
producers claimed that the diameter of the product concerned had an impact on 
the average cost of production per kilogram and that it should consequently be 
taken into consideration in the dumping determination. They also provided 
sufficient evidence to this effect. This claim was accepted. 
2. Normal value 
a) Methodology used to determine normal value 
(13) The majority of the exporting producers objected to the methodology used to 
determine normal value as set out in the third paragraph of recital (14) of the 
provisional duty Regulation. They argued that the normal value of the 
companies with insufficient or no domestic sales should have been constructed 
rather than based on domestic sales of other Indian exporting producers 
investigated. However this argument could not be accepted because this 
approach is specifically provided for in Article 2(1) of the Basic Regulation. 
(14) In support of the argument that it was not appropriate to base normal value on 
the domestic sales of other Indian exporting producers it was also claimed that 
the respective domestic sales were not representative since they allegedly 
represented only a small percentage of total Indian exports to the Community. 
However, in the current proceeding normal value was established on the basis of 
other exporting producers' domestic sales for comparable product types only 
when their sales accounted for 5% or more of the volume exported to the 
Community by each company considered, i.e. when they were representative, as 
defined by Article 2(2) of the Basic Regulation, and were in the ordinary course 
of trade. 
(15) In view of the above, the claim concerning the methodology used to establish 
normal value was rejected. 
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b) Average profit rate of domestic sales 
(16) Some exporting producers argued that the average profit rate established for 
domestic sales of the product concerned was unreasonable since it was 
substantially higher than the profit margin of 5% mentioned in recital (74) of the 
provisional duty Regulation and in the complaint as a reasonable profit rate for 
the Community industry. ITiese exporting producers claimed that a profit rate of 
5% should also be used for the determination of constructed normal value. In 
this respect it should be noted that, pursuant to Article 2(6) of the Basic 
Regulation, where an exporting producer had domestic sales of the like product 
in representative quantities and in the ordinary course of trade, the amount for 
profit used for constructing normal value was based on the weighted average of 
the actual amounts determined for such domestic sales of the like product. 
Where this was not possible, the amount for profit was based, pursuant to 
Article 2(6)(a) of the Basic Regulation, on the weighted average of the actual 
amounts determined for other exporting producers subject to investigation in 
respect of domestic sales of the like product which were representative and in 
the ordinary course of trade. 
(17) In view of the above, the claim concerning the profit rate was rejected. 
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c) Second quality products 
(18) Some Indian companies, which sold second quality products on their domestic 
market during the investigation period, argued that these by-products were 
products concerned and should therefore be included in the normal value 
determination. However, these products differed substantially from first quality 
products in terms of quality, physical characteristics, market perception and 
selling price. Consequently, since only first quality products were exported to 
the Community, the claim was rejected. 
(19) Since no other comments concerning normal value were presented, the findings 
set out in recitals (13) to (15) of the provisional duty Regulation are confirmed. 
3. Export price 
(20) Some exporting producers contested the Commission's standard practice of 
using monthly average exchange rates to convert the export price into domestic 
currency. They claimed that the exchange rates applied to actual transactions 
should have been used. In this respect, it was noted that the differences between 
daily and monthly exchange rates were only marginal. Moreover, depending on 
the transactions, these differences resulted in either slightly higher or lower 
export prices, i.e. the negative differences were offset by the positive 
differences. As a result, the difference between both approaches was, on 
average, not significant. Consequently, the approach followed for the 
determination of provisional findings was confirmed and, therefore, the above 
claim was rejected. 
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(21) One company that made export sales to its subsidiary in the Community 
contested the approach explained in recital (17) of the provisional duty 
Regulation concerning the profit to be deducted for determining a constructed 
export price. This company claimed that the information on the sales of its 
European subsidiary should be used for the above purpose. Since no profit was 
made on these sales, the company contended that no profit be deducted from the 
price to the first independent buyer in order to construct the export price. 
However, according to Article 2(9) of the Basic Regulation, the adjustment to 
be made in order to determine a reliable export price shall include profits 
accruing. Following the practice consistently applied by the Commission and 
the Council and confirmed by the Court of Justice, it was not found appropriate 
to base the calculation of the-profit margin on information from the related 
importer since this profit margin can be influenced by the relation to the 
exporter. The request is therefore rejected and the approach outlined in recital 
( 17) of the provisional duty Regulation is definitively confirmed. 
(22) In the absence of any further arguments concerning the establishment of the 
export price, the findings as set out in recital (16) and (17) of the provisional 
duty Regulation are confirmed. 
4. Comparison 
n 
a) Import charges and indirect taxes 
(23) Some companies claimed that the adjustment granted for import charges should 
be extended to certain additional imported materials subject to import duties. 
This claim could be accepted only to the extent that it was proved that, pursuant 
to Article 2(10)(b) of the Basic Regulation, the materials indicated were 
physically incorporated into the products concerned sold for consumption in the 
exporting country and if the charges were not collected or refunded in respect of 
the product containing such material when exported to the Community. 
b) Level of trade 
(24) One company reiterated its claim for an allowance for differences in levels of 
trade on the grounds that, while it sold for export solely to distributors, it sold to 
both distributors and end-users on the domestic market. It was alleged that the 
prices charged to domestic end-users were consistently higher than the prices 
charged to domestic distributors. This request was not granted for the reasons 
given in recital (21) of the provisional duty Regulation. 
c) Credit 
(25) It was requested that, in order to determine the credit costs of export sales, 
interest rates prevailing on international markets for borrowing foreign currency 
should be used rather than Indian domestic interest rates. This request was 
granted. 
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d) Currency conversions 
(26) Some companies claimed an allowance for currency conversions pursuant to 
Article 2(10)(j) of the Basic Regulation on the grounds that the foreign 
currencies in which they invoiced their export sales had devalued significantly 
against the Indian rupee during the investigation period. These companies 
claimed that, for exchange rate purposes, the date of sale should be the date of 
the purchase order and, in addition, that the exchange rate prevailing 60 days 
before the purchase order date should be used for the dumping calculation. The 
claim that the date of purchase order should be treated as the date of sale could 
not be accepted since this date did not reflect the material terms of sale more 
appropriately than the date of invoice. 
(27) However, where applicable, an allowance for currency conversion was made in 
accordance with Article 2(10)(j) of the Basic Regulation by granting the 
exporting producers 60 days to reflect a sustained movement in exchange rates 
of some foreign currencies in which the export sales of the companies concerned 
were invoiced. 
(28) As no other arguments were presented concerning comparison of normal value 
and export price, the remaining findings set out in recitals (18) to (21) of the 
provisional duty Regulation are confirmed. 
5. Dumping margins 
(29) In the absence of comments on the determination of the dumping margin, the 
methodology set out in recital (22) of the provisional duty Regulation is hereby 
confirmed. 
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(30) After the imposition of provisional measures it was noted that Chandan Steel 
Ltd., which had for the purpose of provisional findings been considered as a 
party without export sales during the investigation period, had actually exported 
the product concerned to the Community during the investigation period. 
Consequently, an individual dumping margin was established for this exporter 
at the stage of definitive findings. 
(31 ) The definitive dumping margins expressed as a percentage of the net free-at-
Community-frontier price are as follows: 
- Bhansali Bright Bars Pvt Ltd. / 
Bhansali Ferromet Pvt Ltd., Mumbai 16.6% 
- Chandan Steel Ltd., Umbergaon 26.9% 
- Facor (Ferro Alloys Corp. Ltd.), Nagpur 7.4% 
- Grand Foundry Ltd., Mumbai 10.2% 
- Isibars Ltd., Mumbai ' 6.6% 
- Mukand Ltd., Mumbai 14.0% 
- Panchmahal Steel Ltd., Baroda 8.7% 
- Parekh Bright Bars Pvt Ltd., Thane 4.2% 
- Raajratna Metal Industries Ltd., Ahmedabad 13.0% 
- Venus Wire Industries Ltd., Mumbai 12.4% 
- Viraj Alloys Ltd. / Viraj Impoexpo Ltd, Mumbai 4.8% 
(32) The dumping margin definitively established for Indian companies other than 
those cooperating in this investigation, expressed as a percentage of the net free-
at-Community-frontier price, is 26.9%. In this respect, the Council took into 
consideration the high level of cooperation and set the country wide dumping 
margin at the highest dumping margin found for a cooperating exporting 
producer. 
(33) For the new exporter mentioned in recital (6) of the provisional duty Regulation 
(Sindia Steel Ltd.) the definitive dumping margin was established according to 
the approach explained in recital (22) of the provisional duty Regulation. The 
dumping margin definitively established for this company, expressed as a 
percentage of the net free-at-Community-frontier price, is 9.5%. 
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E. INJURY 
1. Preliminary remark 
(34) The findings on injury, causation and Community interest in the parallel anti-
dumping and anti-subsidy investigations are identical,. All company specific 
calculations are based on the same data. 
2. Community industry 
(35) After additional verification it was found that the cumulated production volume 
of the Community industry of SSB does not account for 45% of total 
Community production, as erroneously set out in the provisional duty 
Regulation, but for 38% of total Community production. This percentage 
suffices to comply with the conditions in Articles 4(1) and 5(4) of the Basic 
Regulation. 
3. Consumption in the Community, market shares and import volumes from 
India 
(36) Following the disclosure, no comments were received as regards consumption 
of SSB in the Community, the market shares and the volume of imports from 
India. Consequently, the findings made in recitals (29) to (32) of the provisional 
duty Regulation are confirmed. 
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4. Prices of dumped and subsidized imports from India and undercutting 
a) Calculation of the undercutting margins 
(37) As explained in the provisional duty Regulation (recitals 33 to 42), a detailed 
undercutting analysis was carried out for each of the Indian producers concerned 
showing significant undercutting margins. The undercutting margins were 
calculated by comparing per product type the weighted average export prices at 
Community frontier level with the weighted average ex-factory sales prices of 
the Community industry to unrelated parties. Indian product types for which no 
matching Community product type was found were excluded from the 
calculation after it had been established that the remaining transactions were 
sufficiently representative. If exports were made through related companies the 
export prices were duly adjusted for costs between importation and resale to the 
first independent customer in the Community as well as for profits accruing. An 
adjustment was made to the Community industry's sales prices for transport 
costs within the Community. Whereas the Indian exporters sold exclusively to 
traders, the Community industry sold to end-users and traders. Consequently, 
the Community industry's sales to end-users were adjusted to a trader level. In 
addition, the Indian export prices were adjusted for handling charges at 
Community border level. 
(38) Several Indian producers reiterated their requests for an adjustment concerning 
differences in Indian and Community lead times between order and delivery and 
concerning differences in reliability of delivery time. They claimed in particular 
that they regularly had to issue credit notes to their customers due to late 
deliveries. However, credit notes for late deliveries do not indicate that longer 
Indian lead times or unreliability of delivery times affected the sales price when 
the price negotiations took place. Consequently, the claim for this adjustment 
cannot be granted. In this respect, it was also taken into account that the 
contractual delivery times of the Indian producers often varied between four and 
six months without this having an effect on the agreed sales price. 
\C 
(39) All Indian producers also repeated their request for an adjustment for quality 
differences. In particular, they alleged that SSB produced by the Community 
producers had a higher machinability which would reduce cycle times in further 
transformation processes of the SSB. In this respect, it was noted that some 
Community producers did indeed sell a certain proportion of products under a 
trademark indicating higher machinability. However, it was found that there 
was no consistent price pattern indicating that the products with higher 
machinability were sold at higher prices and would thus have a higher market 
value. Consequently, an adjustment could not be granted, since an effect on 
prices and price comparability was not established. In addition, it was noted that 
all Indian producers had made an identical claim for an adjustment, disregarding 
potential quality differences amongst their products. 
(40) One Indian company claimed that the sales price of the Community industry 
consisted of a base price and a so-called 'alloy surcharge', i.e. a price element 
for alloys contained in SSB. The company requested that the alloy surcharge be 
excluded from the Community sales prices for the purpose of the undercutting 
and underselling calculations. This request could not be granted since the alloy 
surcharge was part of the sales price that was paid by the customers. In this 
respect, it was noted that the Indian sales prices also contained an alloy element, 
even if this was not expressly referred to in the invoice. 
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(41) Taking into account the corrections described above, the undercutting margins 
amount to: 
- Bhansali Bright Bars Pvt Ltd. / 
Bhansali Ferromet Pvt Ltd., Mumbai 14.5 % 
- Chandan Steel Ltd., Umbergaon 14.9% 
- Facor (Ferro Alloys Corp. Ltd.), Nagpur 13.0% 
- Grand Foundry Ltd., Mumbai 13.2% 
- Isibars Ltd., Mumbai 19.4% 
- Mukand Ltd., Mumbai 17.8% 
- Panchmahal Steel Ltd., Baroda 13.9% 
- Parekh Bright Bars Pvt Ltd., Thane 5.8% 
- Raajratna Metal Industries Ltd., Ahmedabad 15.8 % 
- Venus Wire Industries Ltd., Mumbai 12.8% 
- Viraj Alloys Ltd. / Viraj Impoexpo Ltd, Mumbai 15.7 % 
(42) The weighted average undercutting margin calculated for Sindia Steel Ltd. (cf. 
recital (33) above) amounted to 16.8%. It was concluded that these undercutting 
margins were significant. 
b) Allegation of anti-competitive behaviour 
(43) In their comments following the disclosure, the Indian companies continued to 
argue that the calculation of undercutting margins as well as the findings on 
other injury factors, causality and Community interest would be meaningless in 
the context of this investigation in view of the Commission decision in the 
competition case IV/35.814, "Alloy Surcharge" (7). This decision stated that 
Community producers of stainless steel flat products had modified 'in a 
concerted fashion the reference values used to calculate the alloy surcharge, a 
practice having the object and effect of restricting and distorting competition 
within the common market'. 
(44) In this respect it is recalled that the decision related to stainless steel 'flat 
products' as opposed to stainless steel bars which belong to the category of long 
products. Moreover, the producers of flat products arid the producers of SSB 
(7) Commission Decision of 2Î. 1. 1998, OJ L100, 1.4. 1998, p.55. 
are, to a large extent, not identical and the number of SSB producers is 
significantly higher than that of the flat steel producers. 
(45) The Indian producers have, however, repeated their allegation that a concerted 
practice existed for SSB. Some of these companies have also lodged a formal 
complaint with the Commission, pursuant to Article 3 of Council Regulation 
(EEC) No 17 (8), concerning SSB. In order to support their allegation, the Indian 
companies submitted that one of the national steel associations in the 
Community circulated to all of its members on a monthly basis a list of the alloy 
surcharges applied by the most important producer in this country. In addition, 
they submitted that this producer applied the same coefficient (so-called yield 
factor) in order to calculate the alloy surcharge for SSB on the basis of the alloy 
surcharge for flat products as a trader in a different Member State. They alleged 
that the information provided conclusive evidence of a concerted practice in the 
SSB market. 
(46) It this respect it is important to note that the application of an alloy surcharge 
system as such including the use of a yield factor is not illegal. The alloy 
surcharge system allows a stainless steel producer - in a legal manner - to reflect 
the price variations of the market prices for alloy elements in the sales prices to 
its customers and thus to protect itself against the risk of significant fluctuations 
in the cost of production. It was also noted that the use of an alloy surcharge is 
common to other steel markets outside the Community and has, with a short 
interruption, been applied in the Community for many years. In addition, for 
ECSC-products, Article 60 of the ECSC Treaty and the implementing 
Community legislation requires the Community producers to inform the 
(8) OJ 13,21. 2.1962, p. 204. 
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Commission and anyone interested of the applicable surcharge (Article 6.b of 
Decision No 37/54 of 29 July 1954 (*)). 
(47) Consequently and in accordance with the Commission Decision in case 
IV/35.814, the application of an alloy surcharge system could only be illegal if 
the alloy surcharge system were applied in a concerted, i.e. anti-competitive, 
manner. However, no conclusive evidence of this was found in the course of the 
investigation. 
(48) In addition, it was found that the price of the Community producers for identical 
products to comparable customers in identical periods varied, resulting in 
different levels of profitability for the Community industry. 
(49) In the light of the above it was concluded that the findings on injury and 
Community interest, including the calculation of undercutting margins, were not 
meaningless as alleged by the Indian companies. Consequently, the Indian 
request that the investigation be terminated forthwith could not be granted. 
Similarly, it was not possible to suspend the anti-dumping investigation until the 
Commission had concluded its investigation relating to the alleged anti-
competitive behaviour because anti-dumping investigations have to be 
concluded within a maximum of 15 months from initiation according to Article 
6 (9) of the Basic Regulation. 
C9) OJ 18, 01.08.1954, p. 470 
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(50) However, it was noted that the Commission is continuing its investigation 
regarding the alleged anti-competitive behaviour. Should the Commission find 
that a concerted practice existed, the conditions to initiate a review ex officio 
would be fulfilled. Such a review would be carried out expeditiously, i.e. within 
maximum 12 months, in order to investigate whether and to what extent the 
relevant findings on injury, causation and Community interest are affected by 
such an anti-competitive practice. 
5. Situation of the Community industry 
(51) Following the adoption of the Regulation imposing provisional duties no 
comments were received as regards the situation of the Community industry in 
respect of production volume, capacity and capacity utilisation, sales volume, 
market share, sales prices, profitability, employment and stocks. Consequently, 
the findings as laid down in recitals (44) to (55) of the provisional duty 
Regulation are confirmed. 
However, the Government of India questioned the conclusions drawn from these 
findings, in particular it was alleged that the drop in the Community production 
figures cannot be blamed on the decreasing Indian imports. This argument 
concerns causality which is dealt with below. Finally, the Government of India 
claimed that the Community industry increased their sales to related parties 
from 1994 to the IP 12 (see recital 28 of the provisional duty Regulation). This 
does, however, not invalidate the findings and conclusions on total sales (in 
particular a negative development of the market share since 1994) and on sales 
to unrelated parties which are also used for the purpose of price undercutting 
calculations. 
(52) On &e basât of the above it was concluded mat the Community industry is 
suffering material iftjury as set out in recital (56) of the provisional duty 
Regulation. 
F. CAUSATION 
(53) Following the adoption of the Regulation imposing provisional duties, some 
Indian companies questioned whether the injury suffered by the Community 
industry was caused by the dumped and subsidized imports from India. In 
particular, it was alleged that the injury was caused by other factors, namely low 
priced imports from other countries. In addition, it was alleged that other 
Community producers had not followed the same trend as the Community 
industry. 
(54) In this respect, it is worth noting that Indian imports were present in significant 
volumes throughout the period considered and peaked at a level of 9.1% market 
share in 1996. It has also been established that these imports were made at 
prices significantly undercutting the Community industry's prices. Account was 
further taken of the fact that a number of traders buy SSB both from Indian and 
Community sources, which leads to the market being transparent and price 
sensitive. 
It was noted that the above trends established for the Indian imports coincided 
with the deterioration of the Community industry's situation, in particular its 
loss of market share and the depression of its prices since 1995. In the presence 
of dumped and subsidized imports of SSB originating in India during the 
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investigation period, the Community industry had to lower its prices 
significantly, regardless of the consequences for profitability. Consequently, a 
causal link between dumped and subsidized imports and material injury suffered 
by the Industry was found to exist. 
(55) It was also investigated whether factors other than the dumped and subsidized 
imports could have contributed to the injury suffered by the Community 
industry. In this respect, it was noted that imports from other countries were 
made either in quantities below or close to the thresholds set out in Article 5(7) 
of the Basic Regulation and/or at higher prices than Indian imports. 
Consequently these imports cannot have broken the causal link between the 
dumped and subsidized imports from India and injury suffered by the 
Community industry. 
(56) In addition, the allegation by some Indian producers that the situation of other 
Community producers was significantly better than that of the Community 
industry was investigated. In this respect, it should be recalled that detailed and 
verified data is only available for the Community industry. Taking into account 
the transparency and the price sensitivity of the SSB market in the Community, 
it seemed however, not unreasonable to conclude that other Community 
producers are likely to have followed a trend similar to that of the Community 
iadttstry, in particular as regards prices. 
(57) Finalry, it was argued that the decrease in the SSB sales prices of the 
Community industry since 1995 was the result of a decrease in alloy prices. In 
this respect, it was however noted that any change in the world market prices for 
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the alloys applies equally to the Indian producers and consequently has no 
influence on the undercutting found. In addition, it was noted that the 
Community industry had also significantly lowered its base prices. 
(58) In the light of the above, the findings set out in the provisional duty Regulation 
(recitals (57) to (65)) are confirmed, i.e. that the low priced dumped and 
subsidized imports from India have, when taken in isolation, caused material 
injury to the Community industry. In addition, it has been established that, given 
the amount of dumping involved, the contribution of dumping to the injury 
caused by the imports in question has been significant. 
G. COMMUNITY INTEREST 
(59) Following the adoption of the Regulation imposing provisional duties no 
substantiated comments were received as regards the Community interest 
analysis set out in recitals (66) to (71) of the provisional duty Regulation. 
(60) Consequently, it is concluded that the imposition of measures will lead to a 
reinstatement of effective competition that will enable the Community industry 
to regain the lost market share and improve its profitability. 
(61) In the absence of a reaction from the users and importers, it was assumed that 
the impact of any expected price increase would be limited, also taking into 
account the level of the duty proposed. As regards the upstream industry, it was 
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concluded that a reinstatement of fair trade would lead to an improvement in its 
competitiveness. 
(62) Summarising, it was concluded that the findings set out in recitals (66) to (71) 
of the provisional duty Regulation can be confirmed. In particular, there are no 
compelling reasons to suppose that it would be not in the interest of the 
Community to impose measures. 
H. ANTI-DUMPING MEASURES 
(63) Based on the above conclusions on dumping, injury, causal link and Community 
interest, it was considered what form and level the definitive anti-dumping 
measures would have to take in order to remove the trade distorting effects of 
injurious dumping and to restore effective competitive conditions on the 
Community SSB market. 
(64) Accordingly, as explained in recitals (72) to (74) of the provisional duty 
Regulation a non-injurious level of prices was calculated which would allow the 
Community industry to cover its cost of production and obtain a reasonable 
return for sales of the product concerned. 
(65) One Indian company argued that the calculation of the non-injurious price level 
was incorrect since the profit margin for all product types was identical. It 
should be noted that the non-injurious price level was calculated on the basis of 
the average sales prices per product type minus the actual weighted average 
profit margin of the Community industry plus a reasonable profit, as explained 
above. This approach was deemed to be the most appropriate for the purpose of 
this investigation. 
(66) The comparison of the non-injurious price levels with the export prices of the 
Imâkm producers ted \o the following injury margins, expressed in relation to the 
free at Community frontier price level: 
- Bhansali Bright Bars Pvt Ltd, / 
Bhansali Ferromet Pvt Ltd., Mumbai 18.4% 
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- Chandan Steel Ltd., Umbergaon 19.0% 
- Facor (Ferro Alloys Corp. Ltd.), Nagpur 16.5% 
- Grand Foundry Ltd., Mumbai 16.6% 
- Isibars Ltd., Mumbai \ 25.5% 
- Mukand Ltd., Mumbai 25.3% 
- Panchmahal Steel Ltd., Baroda 17.6% 
- Parekh Bright Bars Pvt Ltd., Thane 7.5% 
- Raajratna Metal Industries Ltd., Ahmedabad 19.8% 
- Venus Wire Industries Ltd., Mumbai 16.1% 
- Viraj Alloys Ltd. / Viraj Impoexpo Ltd, Mumbai 20.2% 
(67) For the newcomer, Sindia Steels Ltd., as laid down in recital (77) of the 
provisional duty Regulation the weighted average of the injury margins of the 
cooperating Indian companies is applied. This resulted in an injury margin of 
22.1%. 
(68) In accordance with Article 9(4) of the Basic Regulation, the duty rate should 
correspond to the dumping margin, unless the injury margin is lower. This led 
to the following rates of duty for the cooperating producers: 
- Bhansali Bright Bars Pvt Ltd. / 
Bhansali Ferromet Pvt Ltd., Mumbai 16.6% 
- Chandan Steel Ltd., Umbergaon 19.0% 
- Facor (Ferro Alloys Corp. Ltd.), Nagpur 7.4% 
- Grand Foundry Ltd., Mumbai 10.2% 
- Isibars Ltd., Mumbai 6.6% 
- Mukand Ltd., Mumbai 14.0% 
- Panchmahal Steel Ltd., Baroda 8.7% 
- Parekh Bright Bars Pvt Ltd., Thane 4.2% 
- Raajratna Metal Industries Ltd., Ahmedabad 13.0% 
- Venus Wire Industries Ltd., Mumbai 12.4% 
- Viraj Alloys Ltd. / Viraj Impoexpo Ltd, Mumbai 4.8% 
(69) For Sindia Steels Ltd. the duty rate should be 9.5%. 
(70) In order to avoid granting a bonus for non-cooperation and to ensure that no 
circumvention of the anti-dumping measures takes place, it was considered 
appropriate to establish the duty rate for the non-cooperating companies at the 
level of the highest duty rate imposed, i.e. 19.0% since there was a high level of 
cooperation from Indian exporting producers. 
2<Ç 
(71) In accordance with Article 14(1) of the Basic Regulation no product shall be 
subject to both anti-dumping and countervailing duties for the purpose of 
dealing with one and the same situation arising from dumping or from export 
subsidization. As the dumping and subsidy margins have been established on 
imports of the product in question (i0) it is necessary to determine whether and 
to what extent the subsidy and the dumping margins arise from the same 
situation. 
(72) In the case in question all of the investigated subsidy schemes have been found 
to constitute export subsidies within the meaning of Article 3(4)(a) of 
Regulation (EC) No 2026/97. In these circumstances it is not considered 
appropriate to impose both countervailing and anti-dumping duties to the full 
extent of the relevant subsidy and dumping margins established. Consequently, 
the anti-dumping duties are to be reduced by the amount of the countervailing 
duty established in parallel anti-subsidy investigation to reflect the actual 
dumping margins remaining after the imposition of the countervailing duties 
offsetting the effect of the export subsidies. 
(73) Accordingly, the definitive anti-dumping duties are as follows: 
- Bhansali Bright Bars Pvt Ltd. / 
Bhansali Ferromet Pvt Ltd., Mumbai 2.2% 
- Facor (Ferro Alloys Corp. Ltd.), Nagpur 0% 
- Chandan Steel Ltd., Umbergaon 0% 
- Grand Foundry Ltd., Mumbai 0% 
- Isibars Ltd., Mumbai 0% 
- Mukand Ltd., Mumbai 0% 
- Panchmahal Steel Ltd., Baroda 8.7% 
- Parekh Bright Bars Pvt Ltd., Thane 4.2% 
- Raajratna Metal Industries Ltd., Ahmedabad 0% 
- Sindia Steels Ltd., Nashik 0% 
- Venus Wire Industries Ltd., Mumbai 0% 
- Viraj Alloys Ltd. / Viraj Impoexpo Ltd, Mumbai 0% 
(10) Cf. Council Regulation (EC) No /98 imposing a definitive countervailing duty on imports of 
stainless steel bars originating in India, published in this OJ. 
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- AU other companies 0% 
The duty rates apply cumulatively to the duty rates imposed in the parallel anti-
subsidy proceeding. 
I. UNDERTAKINGS 
(74) After expiry of the deadline to submit proposals for undertakings an exporting 
producer submitted a proposal for an undertaking. This company offered to 
respect certain minimum prices. This offer was examined and it was found that 
due to the large variety of the product types concerned and the significant price 
fluctuations for the product concerned it would be difficult to set prices which 
would eliminate the injurious effects of dumped and subsidized imports. 
Consequently, the offer for this undertaking could not be accepted. 
J. COLLECTION OF THE PROVISIONAL DUTIES 
(75) Considering the conclusions on dumping and injury definitively established, the 
provisional duty should be collected: For the period between entry into force of 
the provisional duty Regulation and entry into force of Regulation (EC) No 
1556/98 the amount secured by way of provisional anti-dumping duty should be 
definitively collected at the duty rate definitively calculated and set out in 
recitals (68) to (70) unless the provisional duty rate is lower than the definitive 
duty rate, in which case the provisional duty rates should prevail.. 
For the period following the entry into force of Regulation (EC) No 1556/98 the 
amount secured by way of provisional anti-dumping duty should be definitively 
. collected at the duty rates set out in recital (73). 
Amounts secured in excess of the respective definitive duty rates shall be 
released. 
HAS ADOPTED THIS REGULATION: 
2? 
Article 1 
1. A definitive anti-dumping duty is hereby imposed on imports of stainless steel bars 
falling within CN codes 7222 20 11, 7222 20 21, 7222 20 31, and 7222 20 81 
originating in India. 
2. Products manufactured by the companies listed below shall be subject to the 
following rates of duty applicable to the net, free-at-Community frontier price: 
Manufacturer Rate of duty (%) Taric additional code 
- Bhansali Bright Bars Pvt Ltd., "~22 8226 "" 
Bhansali Ferromet Pvt Ltd., Mumbai 
- Chandan Steel Ltd., Umbergaon 6 8593 
- Facor (Ferro Alloys Corp. Ltd.), Nagpur 0 8400 
- Grand Foundry Ltd., Mumbai 0 8401 
- Isibars Ltd., Mumbai 0 8402 
- Mukand Ltd., Mumbai 6 8403 
- Panchmahal Steel Ltd., Baroda 8 7 8404 
- Parekh Bright Bars Pvt Ltd., Thane 42 8594 
- Raajratna Metal Industries Ltd., Ahmedabad 0 8405 
- Sindia Steels Ltd., Nashik 0 8406 
- Venus Wire Industries Ltd., Mumbai 0 8407 
- Viraj Alloys Ltd., Viraj Impoexpo Ltd, 0 8410 
Mumbai 
- All other companies 0 8900 
3. Unless otherwise specified, the provisions in force concerning customs duties shall 
apply. 
Article 2 
For the period between entry into force of Regulation (EC) No 1084/98 and entry into 
force of Regulation (EC) No 1556/98 the amount of provisional anti-dumping duty 
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secured by way of Regulation (EC) No 1084/98 shall be definitively collected at the 
rates set out in recitals (68) to (70) of this Regulation, unless the duty rates set out in 
Regulation (EC) No 1084/98 are lower than those set out in recitals (68) to (70), in 
which case the duty shall be definitively collected in the amount corresponding to the 
duty rates set out in Regulation (EC) No 1084/98. 
For the period following the entry into force of Regulation (EC) No 1556/98, the 
amount of provisional anti-dumping duties secured by way of Regulation (EC) No 
1556/98 shall be definitively collected at the duty rates set out in Article 1 (2). 
Amounts secured in excess of the respective definitive duty rates shall be released. 
Article 3 
This Regulation shall enter into force on the day following that of its publication in 
the Official Journal of the European Communities. 
This Regulation shall be binding in its entirety and directly applicable in all Member 
States. 
Done at Brussels, 




COM(98) 581 final 
DOCUMENTS 
E N 02 11 10 
Catalogue number : CB-CO-98-585-EN-C 
ISBN 92-78-39905-1 
Office for Official Publications of the European Communities 
L-2985 Luxembourg 
il 
